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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, LAURE1TTA M. GLADDEN, widow, 
and LOUISE GLADDEN, for and on behalf of 
DARLENE LOUISE GLADDEN, minor child of 
CLARENCE ROLAND GLADDEN, deceased. 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a proceeding under the statutes to review 
an award of Workmen's Compensation made by the 
Industrial Conunission to the dependants of Clarence 
R Gladden, deceased, who was killed in an accident on 
February 16, 1959. 
It is admitted by all, and there is no dispute that 
at the tin1e of the accident and death of the decedent 
he was an employee of the plaintiff company, which was 
engaged in the performance of a contract for the con-
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struction of a swirrrming pool at Clearfield, Utah, and 
that the accident and death occurred on the job site 
and during the normal hours of employment. In the 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission, the de-
fense of the plaintiff here was based upon the con-
tention, to which plaintiff here adheres, that at the 
time of the accident the decedent Gladden had departed 
from his employment and that the accident did not 
arise out of or in the course of his employment as re-
quired by Section 35-1-45 U.C.A., 1953. 
We shall endeavor to outline all of the evidence on 
this point for the assistance of the court. 
In the course of this presentation we shall refer to 
the plaintiff John G. Gendri'e Company as the Employer 
and to the decedent Clarence R. Gladden as the employee. 
On the morning of the accident the employe!e worked 
a part of the morning. At that time, according to the 
undisputed testimony of the witness Kahre, Mr. S. W. 
(Bill) Smith, the superintendent of construction on the 
job (R-20) had told the employee there was nothing 
more for him to do-that he should go home, but the 
employee said "No, he was going to put in to noon 
anyway", and that at about that time "the digger came 
along and Smith said, 'Well, you can go ahead and wait 
until noon, and we will get these planks around the 
pool and the plumbing pipes.' " The employee con-
tinued on the job, apparently with this assignment of 
distributing some planks and plumbing pipes about 
the job site. 
On this day Smith and one Verne Kahre and the 
employee Gladden were the only employees of the em-
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ployer on the job, although there were other ernployees 
of ~ubcontractors or equipment furnishers (R-75). 
While Srnith was superintendent of construction 
( R-:20), there is no evidence whatsoever in the record 
that he had any duties or authority except in connection 
with the actual construction work. 
The digger or backhoe, operated by one Rex M. 
rrerkelson, dug a trench along one side of the pool 
proper, the bottom and walls of which had been pre-
viously installed. The ditch was for the purpose of 
laying pipes for the drainage and water circulation 
~ystem. The digger completed the ditch along one side 
and started work on another portion. Sometime about 
mid-afternoon, and forty-five minutes to an hour prior 
to the fatal accident, a small portion of the ditch near 
the end where the digger was then working slid off. 
At that time the employee Gladden was further up the 
ditch in the shallow portion. Superintendent Smith 
at that tirne ordered the employee Gladden to get out 
of the trench and to stay out and not to be caught in 
there under any circumstances. The giving of these 
orders was heard by the witnesses, Rex M. Terkelson 
and Verne C. Kahre, who fully corroborated the fact 
of their giving. Indeed, the fact that the orders were 
given is not disputed. (R-22 lines 18 to 24; lines 14 
to 19; 26 and 27, lin·es 20 to 25 and 7 to 8; 55 and 56, 
lines 16 to 25 and 1 to 25; 57, lines 1 to 8; 72; 79; and 
87). 
The ernployee Gladden acknowledged the order. 
(R-32 lines 11 to 13; and 72, 78 and 79). In fact, the 
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employee told Smith that the employee was "able to 
take care of himself." (R-72) Superintendent Smith 
never changed or modified the order thus given. (R-32) 
Smith was the only man on the job authorized to give 
orders of this kind. (R-32) No one saw the actual 
accident when the trench caved in. The witness Kahre 
was in the swimming pool and heard Smith call out, 
"Man in the trench" and immediately went out to the 
site of the accident, where the trench had been 3:lj2 to 
4 feet deep. Kahre dug decedent out with the help of 
other workmen. After the accident, the decedent was 
found "in a squatting position ... like he was squatting 
down smoking or just passing the time of day." (R-70-
71) If he had been standing up, the cave-in would 
have hit him about the middle of his stomach. By all 
indications, he wasn't working. (72) This is clear, be-
cause at the time ther:e was no work to be done in the 
trench at that particular point (R-27, line 16 to 25; 
22, lines 8 to 11; and 72). The decedent was dead by 
the time he could be extricated. 
About nine o'clock that Bvening Kahre and Smith 
received a call at their Motel from a Mrs. Little, who 
asked Smith and Kahre to come to their home at Clear-
field to talk to Mrs. Gladden. They went. (R-74) 
Up to this point there is no dispute in any of the 
evidence. However, the testimony as to the conver-
sation which took place at the Little home and the 
statements ther·e made by Smith is conflicting. Accord-
ing to the witnesses, Lauretta Gladden, Marvis Little 
and Irene Pelton, :Mr. Smith said that he was sorry 
it happened, and he shouldn't have sent Mr. Gladden 
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down into the ditch. (R-38 and 39; 90; and 92). On the 
contrary, Smith categorically denies having Inade any 
8ueh statements (R-21; 26 and 23), and his version 
is corroborated h~r the witness Kahre, who testified that 
Smith's statmnent was "I am sorry to meet you under 
these circuinstances. I am sorry it happened," that 
"If he had did what I told him to do this morning it 
would never have happened." (R-75) Kahre further 
testified that Smith further stated to :Mrs. Gladden 
and the others at the Little home that Smith had told 
the decedent that morning there was nothing for him 
to do and that he should go on home, but that Smith, 
at Gladden's insistance, permitted him to stay and 
directed him to "get the planks around the pool and the 
plumbing pipes." (R-75) Kahre doesn't recall Smith 
ever Inaking a statement to the effect that it was his 
fault and that he shouldn't have sent Clarence down 
into the trench. (R-76) 
It must be observed that the only evidence what-
soever to contradict the positive evidence that the em-
ployee Gladden had disobeyed orders and departed 
from his employment in entering the ditch is the dis-
puted hearsay testimony above mentioned by the wit-
nesses Gladden, Pelton and Little. There is no evidence 
to indicate that Smith, a superintendent of construction, 
was authorized to make admissions with respect to 
claims against the company or to negotiate with the 
claimant Mrs. Gladden concerning the facts of the acci-
dent or any asserted libility. It is obvious, from the 
record, that Smith was invited to the Little home to 
discuss this question of liability. 
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STATEME1NT OF POINTS 
Point 1. There is a presumption that the deceased em-
ployee was not ordered back into the trench by the 
employer's superintendent of construction. 
Point 2. There is no presumption that deceased em-
ployee was order-ed back into the trench, or that he 
would not have entered the same unless ordered to do so. 
Point 3. The evidence relating to the claimed admis-
sions by the employer's superintendent of construction 
is hearsay and legally incompetent, and cannot sup-
port the award of the Commission. 
Point 4. There is no competent evidence to support the 
findings and award of the Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. There is a presumption that the deceased em-
ployee was not ordered back into the trench by the 
employer's superintendent of construction. 
The existence of the presumption that Smith's orders 
to stay out of the trench continued in full force and 
effect to the time of the accident has double support in 
the facts and the law. 
First, it is established without controversy and by 
the testimony of three witnesses that before the acci-
dent the trench in question had already caved in twice, 
and that Superintendent Smith, within an hour or less, 
had ordered decedent to stay out of the trench and 
not to get caught therein on any account. Snrith testi-
fied positively that this direct order was never with-
drawn or countern1anded. The reasonableness and logic 
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of this testimoy is supported h)· the inferences from the 
uncontroverted fact that cribbing was planned and in-
tended to be coinpleted before any further work should 
be done in the trench. 
Thus, in point of fact decedent Gladden was, within 
the hour, under orders to stay out of the trench. Under 
the law of Utah, and inde·ed under the law generally 
accepted in America, a state of facts once shown to exist 
is presmned to continue unchanged, at least for a reason-
able time under all of the circumstances surrounding the 
situation, in the absence of positive, affirmative evidence 
proving a subsequent change in the existing facts or 
circumstances. Thus, in the case of 
Jensen vs. Logan City (1936) 
89 Utah 347, 57 Pacific 2nd 708, 
the Supreme Court held that evidence that on a certain 
evening loose wires from a cut fence were bent back and 
around an adjoining post raised a controlling inference 
or presumption which prevailed even over some evidence 
that such wires were found out across the sidewalk 
some hours later. 
This is an example of the application of the general 
rule that when things are once proved to have existed 
in a particular state they are presumed to have con-
tinued in that state until the contrary is established 
by evidence either direct or presumptive. 
See I Jones on Evidence Fourth Edition 
Page 101 Section 58. 
The rule is applicable to a status of personal re-
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lations, such as the influence of duress by threat. 
Eureka Bank vs. Bay (Kansas) 
135 Pacific 584. 
The application of this rule here is re-enforced by every 
reasonable consideration of humanity, legality of action 
by employers, and human nature in general. In addition, 
there is the fact testified to by Kahre and Smith that 
there was no reason whateV'er to order decedent back 
into the trench at that particular time and point, as 
the work in the trench had been completed there. 
The presumption that Smith did not countermand 
his pr'evious instructions and order decedent back into 
the trench as contended gains further legal and factual 
support here from the well nigh universal and very 
strong presumption of innocence, in favor of legality, 
and of compliance with law and of rightful action and 
performance of duty. 
Under Section 35-1-12 UCA 1953, it is provided 
that: 
"No employer shall construct or occupy or 
maintain any place of employment that is not 
safe, or require or knowingly permit any em-
ployee to be in any employment or place of em-
ployment which is not safe ... and no employer 
shall fail or neglect to do every other thing neces-
sary to protect the life, health, safety, and wel-
fare of his employees ... " 
Under Sections 68 and 69 of the General Safety 
Orders of The Industrial Commission of Utah, revised 
edition 1959, it was clearly unlawful to order or to per-
mit decedent to work in the trench under its known con-
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clition at and prior to the time of the accident. Shoring 
or cribbing was required before this could be done. 
Under the provisions of Section 35-1-39 UCA, 1953 the 
violation of the statute above-mentioned, and failure, 
neglect, or refusal to obey the lawful safety orders of 
the Commission is a criminal offense. 
As above indicated, under these circumstances, there 
arises a very strong presumption of innocence, in favor 
of legality and compliance with the law, and of rightful 
action and performance of duty by the 'employer and his 
superintendent. This presumption, of course, nega-
tives any order by Mr. Smith directing decedent into 
the dangerous trench, as such an order would be in 
violation of duty, and criminal. Thus, the presumption 
is that no such order was given. 
This presumption in favor of innocence and In 
favor of legality and performance of duty applies In 
civil cases as well as in criminal cases : 
31 CJS "Evidence," page 728 Section 130; page 
769, Section 134; and page 840, Section 150. 
20 Am. Jur. "Evidence", Sec. 221, p. 217; Sec. 
226, p. 221. 
In said Section 221 of American Jurisprudence it 
IS said: 
''One of the strongest disputable presumptions 
known to the law is the presumption "that a 
person is innocent of crime." This presumption 
applies not only in criminal cases, but also in 
civil cases where the commission of the crime 
come collaterally in question." (Emphasis added.) 
This presu1nption has found familiar application in 
Utah in the presumption against fraud: 
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Utah National Bank vs. Nelson, 
38 Utah 160, 111 Pacific 9CY7, 
and the presumption that persons living together as 
man and wife are legally married: 
In re: Pilcher's Estate 
114 Utah 72, 197 Pacific 2nd 143. 
It is one of the most favored presumptions in the law. 
See 
I Jones on E1vidence - Civil Cases, Fourth Edition, 
Section 12 and Section 101. 
In the latter section the learned author says that; 
"Generally speaking, no legal presumption is so 
highly favored as that of innocence; ordinarly 
substantially all other presumptions yield to it 
in case of conflict." 
Thus, a favored and overpowering presumption in 
favor of innocence and lawful activity buttresses and 
supports the positive testimony of Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Kahre that the decedent was ordered to remain out of 
the trench, and Mr. Smith's testimony that such order 
was not countermanded by any later order. 
The testimony is further supported by all reason-
able inferences from the clearly established facts and 
circumstances surrounding the occurrence and by the 
fact that under the Jensen vs. Logan City case, above 
cited, th'e order admittedly given is presumed to con-
tinue in effect until a revocation is affirmatively shown. 
Point 2. There is no presumption that deceased 
e'mployee was ordered back into the trench, or that he 
10 
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'lUoltld not have entered the same unless ordered to do 
so. 
In its decision, the Industrial Commission said 
(Rl08): 
We can legally presume that a servant obeys 
the orders of his master. We can legally presume 
that any individual will take necessary precau-
tions to protect his own life. 
''Nothing is the record explains why Mr. Gladden 
should have ent1ered the ditch in violation of the 
order of Mr. Smith. The presumption is that 
lVIr. Gladden would not have entered the danger-
ous ditch unless ordered to do so by Mr. Smith. 
With these unsupported and inapplicable l'egal state-
ments included by the Commission in its decision, the 
plaintiff ernployer takes very sharp issue. It is respect-
fully submitted that in following these statements the 
Cmnmission inadvertently erred, and that this in turn 
led it into error in making the award. 
The presumption, generally recognized in negligence 
tort cas·es, that a decedent is presumed to be in due 
care for his life until evidence is presented to the con-
trary, does not apply in a Workmen's Compensation 
case, where the question is whether or not an accident 
arose out of or in the course of employment, rather 
than whether or not the decedent was guilty of con-
tributory negligence. The Commission dragged this 
presumption in by the heels from an entirely different 
branch of the law. It should not have done so. Pre-
sumably without the benefit of this presumption, im-
properly relied on, th'e Commission would have reached 
a contrary conclusion under the evidence. 
11 
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In Utah there is no presumption that an employee 
killed within the limits of his employment in terms of 
space and time in fact died in an accident arsing out of 
or in the course of his emplopnent. On the contrary the 
burden is on the claimant, even in death cases, to prove 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the death 
resulted from an accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment. 
Bingham Mines Company vs. Allsop 
59 Utah 306, 203 Pacific 644 Headnote Number 3. 
Higley vs. Industrial Commission 
75 Utah 361, 368, 285 Pacific 306; 
D. H. Perry Estate vs. Industrial Commission 
79 Utah 8, 7 Pacific 2nd 269. 
Thompson vs. Industrial Commission 
82 Utah 247, 23 Pacific 2nd 930. 
The problem of presumption affecting the proof 
of death by accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment is discussed in 100 CJS, 462 et seq., "W ark-
men's Compensation," Section 513 b. It appears that 
there are some states where presumptions have been 
created by statute to the :effect that, in cases of death 
or inability to testify, a workman is presumed to be in 
the course of his employment if he is within the time 
and spatial boundaries of his employment at the time 
of his death, and perhaps in one or two states such a 
presumption is indulged by virtue of judicial decision. 
However, Utah has no such statute, and such judicial 
decisions can have no force or effect in Utah in the 
face of the Utah decisions above cited under this point, 
or in the fac:e of authorities cited under Point 1. More-
over, other authorities hold that under similar cir-
12 
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<'lllll~·dan<~P~ no presumption arises that the employee was 
in the course of his e1nployment. 
100 CJB Page 466, Citing 
:Mello vs. Industrial Accident Commission of Cali-
fornia 258 Pacific 104, and 
Re·ed vs. Sensenbaugh (Missouri Appeals) 
86 Southwestern 2nd 388, and 
71 OJ Page 1061, Note 10. 
:Moreover, all such presumptions in favor of the 
employee shift only the burden of going forward: "Such 
presumptions are rebuttable and they disappear on th'e 
introduction of evidence to the contrary." 
100 CJS 465, 
Notes 33 and 34, and cases there cited. 
The extremely able and r 1espected Massachusetts 
Court had occasion to consider a case almost exactly 
like the one under consideration, although the claim-
ants there had the aid of a statutory presumption 
and hence Were in a stronger position than the claim-
ants here. See 
LeBlanc's Case, 
125 Northeastern 2nd 129. 
In that case the Massachusetts Court held that where 
an employee was found crushed between an elevator 
and its shaft, and the e1nployee had been forbidden to 
operate the elevator and instructed to ride on another 
elevator, the orders forbidding him to operate the 
elevators having been given on two occasions several 
days prior to the accident, a statutory presumption that 
his presence on the elevator was connected with his em-
ployment could not operate, and his dependent was 
13 
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not entitled to compensation. The court in effect held 
that the presun1ption, even though raised by statute, 
applies only in the basence of all contrary or conflicting 
evidence~ it merely shifts the duty to go forward, but 
not the risk of non-persuasion. 
Here the evidence is positive and uncontrovered 
that within an hour prior to the accident the decedent 
had r'eceived positive orders, which he understood and 
acknowledged, to the effect that he was to stay com-
pletely out of the trench. There is further evidence 
that there was no reason for him to be in the trench 
which was connected with his employment. The pre-
sumptions of the continuation of these lawful orders 
arises by virtue of the Jensen vs. Logan City case, supra, 
and receives further very strong support from the 
universal presumption of innocence of crime and of 
compliance with law, as hereinbefore argued. As 
against all of these things, plus Smith's positive testi-
mony that the order to stay out remained effective and 
was never countermanded, we have only claimed oral 
admissions alleged to have been made by Smith, th~ 
construction superintendent, at a meeting solicited by 
friends and relatives of the decedent's widow, whose first 
and primary concern (even on the evening of decedent's 
death) was money. Further, these alleged admissions 
are disputed not only by Smith, but by the independent 
and disinterested witness Kahre. 
e011ec ~*" i"' In passing, it should be said 1l=rt any presumption 
of "du'e care" (although irrelevant) and any presumpt-
ion (if there be one) that servants today obey their 
masters~the very presence of the decedent employee in 
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the trench, at the time and under the circumstances 
and in the face of clear and uncountermanded orders, 
clearly and effectively rubuts and removes such pre-
~umptions and each of them. Res ipsa loquitur. The 
only orders established by cmnpetent evidence were 
to stay out of the trench, and decedent's presence in the 
trench proves that he was not following such orders. 
It is sub1nitted that under the authorities and under 
thP facts, the Commission's findings and award are 
not supported by the presumptions with which the Com-
mission sought to bolster a desired result. 
In conclusion on this point, the specified burden 
of proof resting on the claimants is in effect a pre-
sumption that a decedent was not in the course of his 
employn1ent when killed, and this presumption carries 
through to the end of the case and until overcome by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The general subject of 
presumption is discussed by the Utah court in several 
Utah cases. Alnong the most recent and thorough dis-
cussions are those to be found in: 
Wyatt vs. Baughman, 
121 Utah 123, 239 Pacific 2nd 193, and 
Wood vs. Strevell-Patterson Hardware Company 
(1957), 6 Utah 2nd 340, 313 Pacific 2nd 800. 
Under the rules there announced and under those 
hereinbefore referred to, any presumption that decedent 
Gladden was in the trench pursuant to orders from his 
superior or was ther~e in the course of his employment 
were rebutted and completely disappeared from the 
case immediately upon introduction of the testimony of 
.Jiessrs. Smith, Terkelson, and Kahre to the effect that 
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decedent had been ordered to stay acompletely out of 
the trench. An employer does not have to tie an em-
ployee with an apron string to prove a limiting order . 
. Point 3. The evidence relating to the claimed ad-
missions by the employe~ s superintendent of construct-
ion is hearsay and legally incompetent, and cannot sup-
port the award of the Commission. 
There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever in the 
record to prove that Smith was authorized by defend-
ant corporation to adjust the claims for money asserted 
on the evening of the accident, to stipulate any facts, or 
to make any admissions of fact in behalf of the cor-
poration. He was purely a construction superintendent. 
The alleged admissions do not in any way relate to 
the prosecution of his employers business of construct-
ion of swimming pools, but on the contrary relate to 
an entirely extraneous and separate matter: namely, 
a claim for money again the corporation involving legal 
questions respecting which only an attorney could law-
fully represent a corporation, as such representation 
involved the practice of law. He was not a general 
managing agent, but merely a superintendent of con-
struction with duties confined to the prosecution of the 
work of construction. 
Furthermore, the alleged admissions were not made 
either at the place, or during the time or in the course 
of his employment, but on the contrary were made many 
miles from the scene, at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Little, 
and some six hours or more after the accident, and some· 
four hours or more after the close of the working day, 
during a meeting solicited by relatives of the claimant 
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Lauretta Gladden. He was there for them; not for his 
employer. 
rrhe alleged statements or admissions show on their 
face that they were adverse to the principal, and hence 
presented notice to the claimant that there was no 
authority to Inake the same. From the time of presen-
tation of the claiin to the managing authorities and at-
torneys of employer corporation to this date the author-
ized authorities of the employer have denied the validity 
of and refused to be bound by the alleged admission. 
It clearly follows that under the law of evidence, 
as established in Utah and elsewhere, these alleged ad-
missions were and are hearsay and were not competent 
as evidence against the employer corporation in this 
proceeding. 
S. W. Bridges & Company vs. Candland 
88 Utah 373, 54 Pacific 2nd 842; 
31 CJS "Evidence" Page 1115 Note 63; 
I Jones on Evidence in Civil Cases, Fourth Edi-
tion, Section 255, pages 488 and following. 
See also I Jones on Evidence in Civil Cases, 
Fourth Edition, Section 357, Page 659. 
In the Candland Case Supra} the Supreme Court 
held that statements of an agent employed to sell wool 
belonging to defendant, made after the transaction, to 
the effect that the plaintiff had failed to carry out 
the contract and had caused loss to the defendant, were 
not admissable as admissions of the principal} since 
not within the agent's authority. The case is exactly 
in point. The rule is substantially universal. 
Of course, under the statutes relating to proceed-
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ings before the Industrial Commission (Section 35-1-88, 
DCA, 1953), the Commission is not bound by the regular 
rules of evidence as established by the Supreme Court 
of Utah, and it can receive incompetent hearsay evidence, 
so that no objection to the admission of the evidenc~e 
presented would avail. However,the Supreme Court 
of Utah has specifically held that, while the Industrial 
Commission may admit incompetent hearsay ;evidence, 
it cannot use the same as a basis of a finding or award. 
Ogden Iron Works vs. Industrial Commission 
102 Utah 492, 132 Pacific 2nd 376. 
This case is exactly in point. The testimony as to 
Smith's alleged admission made outside the scope of 
his employment is pure hearsay and completely in-
competent, and cannot form the basis of any award. 
There is therefore, no competent evidence to show, 
that the decedent, at the time of the accident, was within 
the course of, or that the accident arose out of his em-
ployment, but on the contrary all of the competent 
evidence positively and affirmatively shows without 
any doubt that at the time and place of the accident 
the decedent had departed from the course of his em-
ployment and the accident did not arise therefrom. 
Point 4. There is no competent evidence to sup-
port the findings and award of the Commission. 
Point 4 follows more or less as a corollary upon 
the points previously discussed herein. 
In Utah the employer has a right to define and to 
limit the duties and place of employment of its em-
ployees. In this case, by orders of the ;employer's sup-
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erintendent of construction, given in accordance with 
the rrquirenwnts of law, and which under the evidence 
and the presumptions applicable were never counter-
manded, the ditch was excluded from the area of employ-
m cnt and all duty which could be there performed was 
e:rcl11dcd from the employment of the deceased em-
ployee Gladden. Nevertheless, for some unknown 
reason decedent did enter into the ditch, violating 
specific instructions as to employment area and duty. 
When he did so, he departed from the course of his 
employment, and the accident did not and could not 
arise from his employment. See the controlling Utah 
cases of 
Utah Copper Company vs. Industrial Commis-
sion, 62 Utah 33, 217 Pacific 1105, 33 AL,R 1327, 
and 
Salt Lake City vs. The Industrial Commission 
103 Utah 581, 137 Pacific 2nd 364. 
See also LeBlanc's Case, from Massachusetts, supra, 
which is substantially on all fours with the case at Bar. 
In view of th efact that all of the competent evidence 
agrees that the employee left his employment, we do 
not have to prove why he did so. Only he knows, and 
there are a million reasons why he might have done 
so, all of then1 in violation of orders, and all of them 
involving his departure from his employment.. How-
ever, we can well infer from the evidence in the case 
that as he stated he thought "he could take care of 
himself," and had stooped down into the trench to 
light or smoke a cigarette. 
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It is interesting to note in passing that there is 
no evidence that he had any tools with him when he 
entered the trench. 
When the incompetent, unauthorized, and hearsay 
statements attributed to the superintendent Smith are 
disregarded, as they must be in considering whether 
there is any evidence on which to base an award, there 
there is not one scintilla of evidence, and not one thin 
presumption to show that the deceased employee's acci-
dent in this case arose out of or in the course of his 
employment. On the contrary, all of the evidence and 
all lawful presumptions join to show that the decedent 
had departed from his employment at the time of the 
accident, and was in a place where he had no duties 
whatsoever and where he was specifically forbidden to 
be. Under these circumstances, there is no competent 
evidence to support the findings and award of the 
Commission and the same must, as a matter of law, be 
reversed and vacated. 
Such should be the order of this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul Thatcher, of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
1018 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
and 
FUGATE, MAY, :MITCHaM and 
McGINLEY, 
Mining Exchange Bldg. 
Colorado Springs, Colorado. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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